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8. The role of law in Common Security
and Defence Policy: functions, 
limitations and perceptions
Panos Koutrakos
INTRODUCTION
In an essay originally written in the early 1990s, Weiler wrote that, ‘[i]n some
ways, Community law and the European Court were everything an interna-
tional lawyer could dream about: the Court was creating a new order of inter-
national law in which norms were norms, sanctions were sanctions, courts
were central and frequently used, and lawyers were important’.1
This emphasis on law as a motor for integration has been apparent in the
extraordinary process of group therapy which the European Union has under-
gone in the last nine years: the Laeken Declaration of the European Council in
December 2001, the establishment of the European Convention, the process of
the drafting of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the fateful
story of its ratification, the Intergovernmental Conference which led to the
signing of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2007, the tumultuous process of its
ratification and its entry into force on 1 December 2009, all brought the law to
the very centre of the debate about the Union’s direction. And as the process
got longer and the road to the entry into force of the relevant legal arrange-
ments revealed more roadblocks and turns than their drafters had envisaged,
the debate became more heated and its subject-matter wider and more
profound. The fate of the legal rules agreed upon first in the Constitutional
Treaty and then in the Lisbon Treaty was associated with the very identity of
the Union: law was seen as guaranteeing the effectiveness of the Union’s
stature on the world scene. It is interesting in this context that, during the
Russia–Georgia crisis in 2008, President Sarkozy of France, then holder of the
rotating EU Presidency, wrote that, had the Lisbon Treaty entered into force,
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1 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP 1999) pp205–6
where he goes on: ‘Community law as transformed by the European Court was an anti-
dote to the international legal malaise.’
the Union would have had the appropriate institutions to deal with interna-
tional crises.2
The Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of institutional innovations which
provided a focal point for this debate about the role of legal rules in the EU’s
foreign affairs. The appointment of the President of the European Council
under Article 15(6) TEU, and the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy under Article 18 TEU had been anticipated
eagerly as boosting the ability of the Union to act on the international scene.
Similarly, the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS)
under Article 27(3) TEU had been viewed as enhancing the coherence of the
EU’s foreign policies. The appointment of Herman van Rompuy, who had
been the Prime Minister of Belgium for nine months, as the first President of
the European Council, and Baroness Ashton, the Trade Commissioner for a
year and a former head of a regional health authority in the United Kingdom,
were subsequently viewed as distinctly underwhelming. As for the inter-insti-
tutional squabbles which marred the process of setting up the EEAS, they were
not only unhelpful but also entirely typical of the internal conflicts which
underpin the shaping of the Union’s external posture.
The analysis of the institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon
Treaty is beyond the scope of this chapter.3 Instead, the aim of this chapter is
to focus on legal rules which govern the Common Security and Defence
Policy, and examine the different functions which they may assume in areas
which are at the core of national sovereignty. Therefore, the point of reference
for this analysis is distinct from that of the quote which began this chapter: by
focusing on the CSDP, one moves away from the tighter legal system set out
in what used to be the Community legal order. However, it will become appar-
ent that, whilst further away, the subject matter of this chapter is not entirely
distinct from that legal order. The choice of topics it will discuss is highly
selective, the aim being to highlight different functions that legal rules assume
in the CSDP context. The analysis is structured as follows. First, the chapter
will examine the mutual assistance clause introduced at Lisbon and will assess
its limitations in terms of the legal duties it imposes on Member States.
Second, it will outline the provisions on permanent structured cooperation and
will comment on the issues which its application raises. Third, it will analyse
the only provision of primary law on defence products, namely Article 346 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), explain its
evolving interpretation and set it out within the broader legal and political
CSDP context.
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2 Le Figaro, 18 August 2008.
3 See the chapters by Cremona, and Duke.
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CLAUSE: RULES ON THE LIMITS
OF LAW
For the first time in the Union’s constitutional history, the Lisbon Treaty intro-
duced a mutual assistance clause. This is laid down in Article 42(7) TEU
which reads as follows:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments
under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are
members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for
its implementation.
This clause imposes on Member States a duty the scope of which appears to
be very broad: ‘by all the means in their power’. The caveats which are set out
are broad too, as they relate to compliance with international law,4 the neutral-
ity of certain Member States and the fundamental choices about security and
defence made by Member States in relation to NATO. This formulation of the
solidarity clause is entirely consistent with the tenor of CSDP and the balance
which it seeks to strike between the security and defence choices made by the
Member States and the common policy which it envisages for the Union. It is
recalled that, under Article 42(2) subparagraph 2 TEU, the CSDP
shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of
certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States,
which see their common defence realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common secu-
rity and defence policy established within that framework.
However, the questions which Article 42(7) TEU raises are how far are
Member States required to go in order to comply with their duty and how
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4 According to Art. 51 UN Charter, ‘[n]othing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.’
rigorous can the enforcement of this duty be. Its wording suggests that, rather
than a mutual defence clause, the duty this provision sets out is one of mutual
assistance. This is a significant distinction because, quite apart from the
semantics of the clause, it suggests two points: on the one hand, military
means constitute merely one option open to a Member State when it examines
how best to comply with its duty; on the other hand, it suggests that there is a
broader set of parameters within which national authorities are expected to
make this assessment. Even with due regard to the States to which the above
caveats refer, compliance with the mutual assistance clause cannot but depend
on the subjective assessment of a Member State as to how best it may assist a
State which is a victim of armed aggression on its territory. This assessment is
subject to multifarious considerations, not least of a political and economic
nature. Such inherently indeterminate criteria do not lend themselves to a
rigorous mechanism of verification or control. It is interesting that, in their
Decision on the Concerns of the Irish People on the Treaty of Lisbon, the
Heads of State or Government Meeting within the European Council state that
the CSDP ‘does not prejudice the security and defence policy of each Member
State, including Ireland, or the obligations of any Member State’.5
Furthermore, in a case of armed aggression on the territory of a Member
State, time would be of the essence, and protracted negotiations between
Member States would merely reduce the relevance of the assistance which the
State under attack would require. In other words, it is for each Member State
to ascertain which means it is prepared to utilise and in which manner in order
to assist another State under attack. There can be no common assessment of
whether, for instance, military means should be relied upon by all Member
States. After all, the EU is not a military alliance,6 and the mutual assistance
clause may not render it into one. Therefore, the similarity of their wording
notwithstanding, comparisons between Article 42(7) TEU and the mutual
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5 Brussels European Council, 18–19 June 2009, Presidency Conclusions,
1225/2/09 REV 2, Annex 1, p18.
6 See, for instance, Declaration 13 concerning the Common Foreign and
Security Policy which is annexed to the Lisbon Treaty: ‘The Conference underlines that
the provisions in the Treaty on European Union covering the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, including the creation of the office of High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of an External
Action Service, do not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they
currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their
national representation in third countries and international organisations.
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and
Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence
policy of the Member States’.
defence clauses laid down in Article V of the Brussels Treaty7 or Article 5 of
the NATO Charter8 are misplaced.9
The above does not mean to suggest that the provision of Article 42(7) TEU
is not significant. On the one hand, it is a specific illustration of political soli-
darity, one of the main pillars of CFSP as laid down in Article 24(3) TEU. As
such, it may appear to merely state the obvious. However, when it comes to
the Union’s foreign policy, the obvious often needs to be stated. It is recalled
that, when Greece claimed that its territorial integrity was undermined by
Turkey in the Imia incident in December 1995, and Spain made a similar claim
regarding Morocco in the Leila incident in July 2002, their fellow Member
States failed woefully to provide any substantial support in terms of political
solidarity, let alone even assurances about military assistance.10 It is against
this background that the mutual assistance clause must be understood. On the
other hand, as the principle of political solidarity, the interpretation of the
mutual assistance clause is subject to continuous redefinition: the development
of CSDP and political solidarity in general, and of common structures of mili-
tary capabilities in particular, is bound to have an impact on how close to the
military end of the scale Member States would be prepared to go in order to
assist a Member State under attack.
There is another function of the mutual assistance clause which is note-
worthy: against the various CSDP missions which are carried out in far-flung
places and export EU values to third parties, it renders the CSDP relevant to
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7 This provides that, ‘[i]f any of the High Contracting Parties should be the
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the
Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.’
8 This reads as follows: ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately
be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.’
9 See the statement to the contrary by Open Europe in House of Lords Select
Committee Twelfth Report The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment (HL 62-II)
C35.
10 See J. Monar, ‘The CFSP and the Leila/Perejil Island Incident: The Nemesis
of Solidarity and Leadership’, (2002) 7 EFA Rev 251.
the Union’s citizens in a much more direct and concrete manner. By suggest-
ing a tangible benefit to the security of each Member State at a time of crisis,
it brings the Union closer to its citizens, hence meeting one of the main objec-
tives of the reform of the EU constitutional order which started with the
European Convention and led to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.11
In addition to the mutual assistance clause set out in Article 42(7) TEU,
there is a solidarity clause which is laid down in Article 222 TFEU. Its first
paragraph reads as follows:
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a
Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, includ-
ing the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
(a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
– protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist
attack;
– assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities,
in the event of a terrorist attack;
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in
the event of a natural or man-made disaster.
In addition to the Union, the other Member States are also to assist a Member
State under a terrorist attack or a victim of a natural or man-made disaster at
the request of its political authorities.12 The threats facing the Union are
assessed regularly by the European Council in order to ensure that both the
Union and its Member States can take effective action.13
The solidarity clause has a clear security and defence dimension. This is
illustrated by the reference to the military resources of the Member States, and
is acknowledged by its procedural provisions: according to Article 222(3)
TFEU, the Council decides on the arrangements for the implementation of the
clause following a joint proposal by both the Commission and the High
Representative; where this decision has defence implications, it will be
adopted by unanimity in accordance with Article 31(1) TEU, with the
European Parliament being kept informed;14 furthermore, the Council is
assisted by the Political and Security Committee, along with the CSDP struc-
tures (such as the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff).15
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11 This features prominently in the Laeken Declaration of the European Council
(December 2001).
12 Art. 222(2) TFEU.
13 Art. 222(4) TFEU.
14 This implies that, in the absence of defence implications, decisions are
adopted by a qualified majority.
15 A standing committee provided for in Art. 71 TFEU will also participate, if
The core of the solidarity clause could well have been placed in Title V
TEU. In fact, it is striking that there is no reference to terrorism in the mutual
assistance clause in Article 42(7) TEU. After all, it is recalled that terrorism
features prominently in the European Security Strategy16 as well as the 2008
Report on its implementation.17 On the other hand, the reference to Article 222
TFEU illustrates the broader understanding of security which now informs the
Union’s activities and establishes a link with the European Security Strategy
as the latter, even when the Union was based on the tripartite pillar structure,
puts forward the need for a combination of a broad range of instruments.18 The
significance of the reference to terrorism, as well as the solidarity clause itself,
is illustrated by the European Council’s Declaration on Combating Terrorism.
Adopted in response to the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004,
the Declaration refers expressly to the precursor to Article 222 TFEU in the
Constitutional Treaty:19 it refers to the spirit of that provision and sets out 
the commitment of the Member States, as well as the acceding States, to act
jointly in case one of them becomes the victim of a terrorist attack.20
In terms of its CSDP links, another noteworthy feature of the solidarity
clause is its broad scope. The action it envisages is not confined to response to
terrorist attacks. Instead, it is about prevention and protection, as well as assis-
tance. The temptation for testing the outer limits of the Union’s competence
might end up being too great in the light of the increasing securitisation of its
policies.
Finally, it is worth noting that, in their Decision on the Concerns of the Irish
People on the Lisbon Treaty, the Heads of State or Government of the
European Union state that it ‘will be for Member States – including Ireland,
acting in a spirit of solidarity and without prejudice to its traditional policy of
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necessary by submitting joint proposals with the Political and Security Committee. The
former aims ‘to ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted
and strengthened within the Union’ and to ‘facilitate coordination of the action of the
Member States’ competent authorities’. Its proceedings may involve representatives of
the Union bodies, offices and agencies, and the Parliament and national Parliaments
must be kept informed of them.
16 A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels, 12
December 2003).
17 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing
Security in a Changing World (S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008).
18 The ESS points out that, ‘in contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold
War, none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely mili-
tary means. Each requires a mixture of instruments’ (at 7).
19 Namely Art. 42 of the Constitutional Treaty.
20 There is also the following clarification: ‘It shall be for each Member State or
acceding State to the Union to choose the most appropriate means to comply with this
solidarity commitment towards the affected State.’
military neutrality – to determine the nature of aid or assistance to be provided
to a Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of
armed aggression on its territory’.21
PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION: RULES
SETTING OUT A BROAD FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
The Treaty provides a mechanism for permanent structured cooperation. In
accordance with Article 42(6) TEU, this is open to Member States ‘whose
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding
commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding
missions’. However, rather than merely outlining the relevant criteria, the
drafters of the Treaty defined them further. In a Protocol attached to the Lisbon
Treaty, the commitments on military capabilities are set out in detail. In Article
1, a Member State wishing to participate in a structured cooperation mecha-
nism is required to
(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the develop-
ment of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multina-
tional forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of
the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition
and armaments (European Defence Agency), and
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a
component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions
planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements includ-
ing transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 28
B of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in
response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be
sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.
These are further defined in Article 2 of the Protocol, according to which the
participating Member States undertake to
(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to
achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on
defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the secu-
rity environment and of the Union’s international responsibilities;
(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, partic-
ularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and,
where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encour-
aging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;
(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility
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and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives
regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national
decision-making procedures;
(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good,
including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings
in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived
in the framework of the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’;
(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European
equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.
Member States fulfilling the criteria and having made the above commitments
may notify their intention to engage in permanent structured cooperation to the
Council and the High Representative. In accordance with Article 46(2) TEU,
the decision to establish such cooperation rests with the Council which is
expected to take it within three months following notification by a qualified
majority and following consultation with the High Representative. In terms of
its management, any decision and recommendation by the Council within the
context of permanent structured cooperation is taken unanimously on the basis
of the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States under
Article 46(6) TEU, unless otherwise provided for in Article 46 TEU.
There are certain principles which appear to govern the permanent struc-
tured cooperation mechanism. First, the principle of openness: provided that
the criteria and requirements set out in Article 46(1) TEU and Articles 1 and 2
of the Protocol are met, any Member State may participate in the mechanism,
either ab initio or at a later stage. In the latter case, following a notification
from the relevant State to the Council and the High Representative, the
Council will adopt the decision confirming the participation of the Member
State by a qualified majority of the participating Member States and after
consulting the latter.22
The second principle is that of continuity: every participating Member
State must fulfil the criteria and make the necessary commitments throughout
their participation. According to Article 46(4) TEU, if at any point they cease
to do so, the Council may suspend the participation of the Member State
concerned by a qualified majority of the members representing the participat-
ing Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question. In this
respect, Article 3 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation
provides for the involvement of the European Defence Agency (EDA). In
accordance with this provision, the role of the EDA is broad: it contributes to
the regular assessment of participating Member States’ contributions regard-
ing capabilities in general, and in particular those made in accordance with the
criteria to be established on the basis of, amongst others, Article 2 of the
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Protocol. However, its impact is limited, at least as a matter of law: whilst it is
entrusted with reporting at least once a year, its assessment ‘may serve as a
basis for Council recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with
Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union’.23
Third, the free will of the Member States is an essential precondition for
their participation: any participating Member State may withdraw by notify-
ing its intention to do so to the Council. The latter has neither the power to veto
this nor the right to approve it. In accordance with Article 46(5) TEU, it will
merely ‘take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate’.
Fourth, the definition of the capabilities criteria mentioned in Article 46(1)
TEU and set out in Article 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured
Cooperation is subject to a dynamic, incrementally evolving process. Both
Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol suggest that they need to be further elaborated
on and defined in greater detail. On the one hand, it would be odd if things
were otherwise: requirements related to military capabilities may vary depend-
ing on factors as diverse as technical and operational needs, geopolitical envi-
ronment, activities of international security organisations, financial
conditions, political commitment. After all, primary law is inherently unsuit-
able to define with any degree of precision such requirements. On the other
hand, the vagueness of the relevant provisions is such as to render their appli-
cation entirely a matter to be determined on the basis of factors as inherently
indeterminate as political will, and as constantly evolving as economic reali-
ties.
The vagueness of the legal rules on permanent structured cooperation
reminds one of the vagueness of the Lisbon Treaty in general and Article 18
TEU in particular in relation to the function of the High Representative. It is
recalled that, from a legal point of view, these provisions are strikingly vague
as to the precise functions of the new post, and leave considerable scope for
overlaps and inter-institutional skirmishes. This is all the more so as the provi-
sions about the function of the President of the European Council, that is,
another actor involved in the representation of the Union, are similarly
opaque.24 It may appear curious that the post of High Representative, which
purported to bring clarity and coherence in the EU’s external policies, should
be defined in such unclear terms as to further feed the inter-institutional
tensions which have marred these policies. This also became apparent from
the tensions and inter-institutional haggling which characterised the establish-
ment of the European External Action Service, as well as the complex arrange-
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24 See Editorial, ‘New Links in the Union’s Institutional Chain’, (2009) 35
ELRev 1, and Editorial, ‘Mind the gap!’, (2008) 45 CMLRev 317.
ments finally agreed upon.25 Similarly, viewed as a way of enabling the Union
to shape its security and defence identity more efficiently, one may have hoped
that the mechanism of permanent structured cooperation would have provided
a clearer yardstick as to quite how the Member States may rely upon it. In both
cases, the relevant legal provisions appear to acknowledge that their contribu-
tion to the Union’s foreign affairs is merely to set out the broad parameters
within which the Member States and the Union’s institutional actors may
determine how to proceed, at what pace and in which direction.
DEFENCE INDUSTRIES AND THE EVOLVING 
UNDERSTANDINGS OF LAW
The application of the mechanism for permanent structured cooperation
outlined above relies upon the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA).
Originating in the identical provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon
Treaty is the first set of primary rules which provides for this organisation.
Article 42(3) subparagraph 2 TEU provides that EDA
shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those
requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing
any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the
defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments
policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capa-
bilities.
However, in yet another illustration of how the law may follow and merely
formalise existing practice, the EDA had been established before the
Constitutional Treaty was even signed, in July 2004.26 The objective of the
Agency is ‘to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to
improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to
sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future’ without preju-
dice to either the competences of the EC or those of the Member States in
defence matters.27 The tasks carried out by EDA are in the areas of defence
capabilities development, armaments cooperation, European Defence
The role of law in Common Security and Defence Policy 245
25 See Council Decision 2010/427/EU [2010] OJ L 201/30 which is accompa-
nied by The Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability ([2010]
OJ C 210/1, and [2010] OJ C 217/12) setting out the practicalities of the interactions
between the High Representative and the European Parliament.
26 Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP [2004] OJ L245/17.
27 Ibid, Articles 2(1), 1(2) and 2(2).
Technological and Industrial Base and defence equipment market, and
research and technology.28
Whilst limited in scope, the work of EDA has not been without controversy.
The determination of its budget has been a constant source of disagreement:
the United Kingdom has refused to agree on a three-year budget, the absence
of which, according to other Member States, hampers EDA’s work. In terms
of specific outcomes, it is worth referring to the adoption of a voluntary code
on defence procurement in November 2005. Having entered into force on 1
July 2006, this applies to contracts worth more than 1m which are subject to
the special clause of Article 346 TFEU.29 It sets out to establish a single online
portal, provided by the EDA, which would publicise procurement opportuni-
ties. It is based on objective award criteria based on the most economically
advantageous solution for the particular requirement. Furthermore, it provides
for debriefing, whereby all unsuccessful bidders who so request will be given
feedback after the contract is awarded. The regime provides for exceptions for
reasons of pressing operational urgency, follow-on work or supplementary
goods and services, and extraordinary and compelling reasons of national
security. This development brings focus on defence industries and the extent
to which their regulation may contribute to the CSDP. From a legal point of
view this is a most interesting issue, as it straddles law and politics, and has
been at the outer margins of European integration since the establishment of
the European Communities. It is this story that the remaining part of this chap-
ter will tell.30
Primary Law and Defence Industries: Lingering Misconceptions
There is only one provision in the primary law of the EU which refers
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28 For early assessments, see: A. Georgopoulos, ‘The New European Defence
Agency: Major Development or Fig Leaf?’ (2005) 14 Public Procurement Law Review
103; P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2006)
pp473–5; M. Trybus, ‘The New European Defence Agency: A Contribution to a
Common European Security and Defence Policy or a Challenge to the Community
acquis?’ (2006) 43 CMLRev 667.
29 Contracts which fall beyond the scope of Art 346 TFEU are covered by the
EC public procurement secondary legislation. According to Art 10 of Dir 2004/18/EC
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public
supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114, ‘[t]his Directive
shall apply to public contracts awarded by contracting authorities in the field of
defence, subject to Article [346 TFEU]’.
30 This section draws upon P. Koutrakos, ‘The Application of EC Law to
Defence-related Industries: Changing Interpretations of Article 296 EC’ in C. Barnard
and O. Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2009) 307.
expressly to the defence industries, namely Article 346 TFEU (ex Article 296
EC). It reads as follows:
1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the following
rules:
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which
it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding prod-
ucts which are not intended for specifically military purposes.
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, make
changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products to which the
provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.
For a long time, this rather obscure provision of the Treaty was viewed as
rendering defence industries beyond the reach of EU law entirely. A broad
interpretation of its wording was used to substantiate this: on the one hand, the
scope of products which fell within the scope of Article 346 TFEU was viewed
as potentially unlimited; on the other hand, the circumstances under which
Member States could deviate from EU law were ignored or viewed as merely
indicative of the general status of the defence industries as directly linked to
national sovereignty. Therefore, the Member States were only too keen to
presume that measures regulating their defence industries would be beyond
the scope of EU law.31 This approach was tolerated by the EU institutions.32
It is interesting that the European Parliament confined itself to arguing regu-
larly for the deletion of Article 346 TFEU,33 as if that would have been the
only way of preventing the erroneous and misguided interpretation of its
provision. The elusive character of the list mentioned in Article 346(2) TFEU
did not help either: it was only published in the Official Journal of the
European Union forty three years following its adoption in a response by the
Commission to a question by the European Parliament.34
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34 Written Question E-1324/01 [2001] OJ C/364E/85. In the meantime, it had
only been published in academic analyses: see H. Wulf (ed), Arms Industry Limited
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However, a careful reading of Article 346 TFEU suggests that this approach
is misconceived. First, it is confined to the products which are described in the
list mentioned in Article 346(2) TFEU. Therefore, the reference to ‘the
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material’ was not envisaged
as an open-ended category of products. This suggests that at no point was it
envisaged that dual-use goods, that is products which may be of both civil and
military application, should be regulated by national measures deviating from
the entire body of EU law. Such an argument is supported by both the content
of the list mentioned in Article 346(2) TFEU and the reference to the effects
that such measures should not have on ‘products which are not intended for
specifically military purposes’ in Article 346(1)(b) TFEU.
Second, measures adopted by a Member State under Article 346 TFEU are
not ipso facto justified; instead, the deviation from EU law which they entail
must be ‘necessary for the protection of the essential interests of [national]
security’. This is quite an emphatic statement that, rather than being merely a
public security clause, Article 346(1)(b) TFEU should be invoked only when
the protection of the core of national sovereignty is at stake.
Third, any reliance upon Article 346 TFEU should take into account the
effects which its deviation from EU law may have on the status and movement
of other products which fall beyond its rather narrow scope. In effect, this
provision suggests that national measures deviating from EU law as a whole
should not be adopted in a legal vacuum. Instead, Member States are under a
duty to consider the implications that such measures may have for the
common market.
Fourth, Article 348(1) TFEU provides for the involvement of the
Commission in cases where reliance upon Article 346 TFEU by a Member
State would lead to distortions of competition. This provision should be inter-
preted in the light of the duty of loyal cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3)
TEU (ex Article 10 EC). In other words, a Member State invoking Article 346
TFEU is under a legal duty to cooperate with the Commission in order to
adjust any ensuing distortions of competition to the EU law.
Finally, any deviation from EU law under Article 346 TFEU is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The reference to the ‘improper use of
the powers provided for in Article … 346’ in Article 348 second subparagraph
TFEU refers both to the substantive conditions which need to be met by a
Member State invoking Article 346 TFEU (namely those regarding its scope
of application, the assessment of ‘essential interests of security’) and to the
procedural ones (that is the duty to cooperate with the Commission provided
for in Article 348 first subparagraph TFEU).
It follows from the above that, according to a strict reading of Articles 346
TFEU and 348 TFEU, Member States may regulate their defence industries by
deviating from EU law only in so far as such a deviation is confined to a
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specific class of products, is exercised in accordance with certain principles
and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to ascertain whether it
amounts to an abuse of power. This interpretation has gradually been accepted
as a matter of EU law. This has been due to a variety of factors, three of which
are particularly significant, namely the case-law of the Court of Justice, the
considerable structural and financial difficulties of the defence industries since
the 1990s and the emerging political climate in the EU which is marked by the
development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.
The Role of Europe’s Judges
In its first judgment on the applicability of ex Article 296 EC (new Article 346
TFEU), the Court of Justice left no doubt as to the strict interpretation of this
provision. In Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain,35 the Court dealt with
Spanish legislation exempting from VAT intra-Community imports and acqui-
sitions of arms, munitions and equipment exclusively for military use. The
Sixth VAT Directive excluded aircraft and warships. The action against Spain
was brought because the relevant Spanish rules also covered an additional
range of defence products. The Spanish Government argued that a VAT
exemption for armaments constituted a necessary measure for the purposes of
guaranteeing the achievement of the essential objectives of its overall strate-
gic plan and, in particular, to ensure the effectiveness of the Spanish armed
forces both in national defence and as part of NATO. In its judgment, the Court
ruled as follows:
Spain has not demonstrated that the exemptions provided for by the Spanish Law
are necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security. It is clear
from the preamble to [the relevant national] Law that its principal objective is to
determine and allocate the financial resources for the reinforcement and modern-
ization of the Spanish armed forces by laying the economic and financial basis for
its overall strategic plan. It follows that the VAT exemptions are not necessary in
order to achieve the objective of protecting the essential interests of the security of
the Kingdom of Spain.36
It then concluded that:
the imposition of VAT on imports and acquisitions of armaments would not compro-
mise that objective since the income from payment of VAT on the transactions in
question would flow into the State’s coffers apart from a small percentage which
would be diverted to the Community as own resources.37
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This suggests a robust approach which, rather than viewing Article 346 TFEU
as a carte blanche for Member States in the area of defence industries, requires
that the Member States substantiate how the deviation from EU law they deem
necessary meets the substantive conditions set out in primary law. This
approach was adopted four years later by the Court of First Instance38 and was
reaffirmed by the Court of Justice more recently in Case C-337/05
Commission v Italy39 and Case C-157/06 Commission v Italy.40 These cases
were about the purchase of Agusta helicopters for the use of police forces and
the national fire service by a negotiated procedure in contravention of EC
public procurement legislation which provided for a competitive tendering
procedure.41 This was a long-standing practice in Italy, and the Government
did not contest that the helicopters in question were clearly for civilian use,
and that their military use was only potential. Both cases are about the same
practice and raise the same issues. This analysis will focus on Case C-337/05
where the judgment was rendered by the Grand Chamber. The Court first reaf-
firmed the strict interpretation of the exceptional clauses set out in the
Treaties:
It cannot be inferred from those articles that the Treaty contains an inherent general
exception excluding all measures taken for reasons of public security from the
scope of Community law. The recognition of the existence of such an exception,
regardless of the specific requirements laid down by the Treaty, would be liable to
impair the binding nature of Community law and its uniform application.42
It then pointed out that
It is clear from the wording of that provision that the products in question must be
intended for specifically military purposes. It follows that the purchase of equip-
ment, the use of which for military purposes is hardly certain, must necessarily
comply with the rules governing the award of public contracts. The supply of heli-
copters to military corps for the purpose of civilian use must comply with those
same rules.43
The argument of the Italian Government that a deviation from the EC public
procurement rules was necessary in order to protect the confidentiality of
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information about the production of the purchased helicopters was dismissed
by the Court as disproportionate. It was pointed out that no reasons were
presented to justify why the confidentiality of the information communicated
for the production of the helicopters manufactured by Agusta would be less
well guaranteed were such production entrusted to other companies, in Italy or
in other Member States.44
The Court was no more sympathetic to the final arguments by the Italian
Government that, because of their technical specificity, the manufacture of the
helicopters in question could be entrusted only to Agusta and that this was
necessary to ensure the interoperability of its fleet of helicopters, in order,
particularly, to reduce the logistic, operational and pilot-training costs. It
responded as follows:
In this case, the Italian Republic has not discharged the burden of proof as regards
the reason for which only helicopters produced by Agusta would be endowed with
the requisite technical specificities. In addition, that Member State has confined
itself to pointing out the advantages of the interoperability of the helicopters used
by its various corps. It has not however demonstrated in what respect a change of
supplier would have constrained it to acquire material manufactured according to a
different technique likely to result in incompatibility or disproportionate technical
difficulties in operation and maintenance.45
The recent case-law of the Court of Justice makes it clear that reliance upon
the notion of necessity may not justify ipso facto any deviation from EU rules.
It is not only the subject-matter of these cases, which is an area long viewed
as within the twilight zone between EU law and national sovereignty, that
makes the above rulings noteworthy. It is also the rigour with which the Court
responded to the vague arguments put forward by the national governments.
Member States are required to explain what it is precisely which necessitates
a deviation from an EU rule.
However, it would be wrong to assume that the Court has expressed its
willingness to meddle with the substantive policy choices made by the
Member States in areas which are close to the core of national sovereignty.
Indeed, the above rulings should be viewed in their context. In the actions
against Italy, for instance, the defences put forward by the Italian Government
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were staggering in their generality and the absence of any specific argument
whatever which would substantiate, even remotely, their decision.
Furthermore, the remoteness between the subject-matter of the action and the
scope of Article 346 TFEU was not contested even by the Italian Government.
After all, the helicopters were envisaged for the use of forces such as the Corps
of Fire Brigades, the Carabinieri, the Coastguard, the Guardia di Finanza
Revenue Guard Corps, the State Police and the Department of Civil Protection
in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Put differently, the cases on
which the Court has rendered the above rulings were about egregious viola-
tions of both the wording and spirit of Article 346 TFEU, violations which
exemplified the presumption, widely held by Member States, that primary law
granted them a carte blanche in the area. It by no means follows that the Court
would adopt an intrusive and activist approach once substantive policy choices
are explained properly in relation to the requirements set out in Article 346
TFEU.
Emerging Re-interpretations
In this context of gradual realisation of the constraints attached to primary law,
and the willingness of the EU’s judiciary to enforce them, two factors raised
further interest in the status of defence industries. The first has been the devel-
opment of the CSDP on which considerable time and energy has been spent
since 1998.46 For the purpose of this chapter, suffice it to recall the statement
in the European Security Strategy about the European Union’s ambition for
‘[a]n active and capable European Union [which] would make an impact on a
global scale’47 in terms of ‘shar[ing] in the responsibility for global secu-
rity’.48 The second factor is the perilous state of the defence industries in the
Member States. Following the end of the Cold War they have been suffering
from considerable financial and structural problems, such as fragmentation
and divergence of capabilities, excess production capability in certain areas
and shortages in others, duplication, short production runs, reduced budgetary
resources, and failure to engage in increasingly costly research.49 This highly
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fragmented state has been exacerbated by the financial crisis which has made
the most important military powers in the Union, namely the United Kingdom
and France, cut back on their military spending,50 and has forced the former
to focus almost exclusively on its needs in the war in Afghanistan.
In the light of the above legal, political and economic developments,
defence industries have been gradually brought to the centre of the attention
of both the Union and its Member States. It is in this context that considerable
developments have taken place under EU law. Two specific initiatives illus-
trate this: first, the Commission’s statement that it intends strictly to enforce
the proper interpretation of ex Article 296 EC (Article 346 TFEU); second, a
host of legislative initiatives aiming to extend the application of EU law to
defence industries.
In December 2006, the European Commission put forward its view as to
the proper interpretation of ex Article 296 EC (Article 346 TFEU), and
expressed its intention to apply it rigorously by enforcement proceedings
before the Court of Justice.51 The aim of the document was ‘to prevent possi-
ble misinterpretation and misuse of Article 296 EC in the field of defence
procurement’ and ‘give contract awarding authorities some guidance for their
assessment whether the use of the exemption is justified’.52 The Commission
draws upon the wording of what is now Article 346 TFEU53 and the case-law
of the EU courts and states that ‘both the field of and the conditions of appli-
cation of Article [346 TFEU] must be interpreted in a restrictive way’. It
acknowledges the wide discretion granted to a Member State in order to deter-
mine whether its essential security interests ought to be protected by deviating
from EC law. However, this discretion is not unfettered. To that effect, it is
argued that any interests other than security ones, such as industrial or
economic, cannot justify recourse to Article 346 TFEU even if they are
connected with the production of and trade in arms, munitions and war mate-
rial. In relation to the role of the Member States, the Commission states that
It is the Member States’ prerogative to define their essential security interests and
their duty to protect them. The concept of essential security interests gives them
flexibility in the choice of measure to protect those interests, but also a special
responsibility to respect their Treaty obligations and not to abuse this flexibility.54
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What are the implications of this approach in the area which has given rise to
most of the cases before the Court, namely public procurement? According to
the Commission,
the only way for Member States to reconcile their prerogatives in the field of secu-
rity with their Treaty obligations is to assess with great care for each procurement
contract whether an exemption from Community rules is justified or not. Such case-
by-case assessment must be particularly rigorous at the borderline of Article 296 EC
where the use of the exemption may be controversial.55
In its initiative, the Commission makes a declaration of intent: national
measures governing the defence industries would no longer be viewed as
inherently above EU law, and any deviations from the Treaties would be
pursued before the Court of Justice. In terms of the substance of its construc-
tion of Article 346 TFEU, there is nothing in the Communication which is
revolutionary or which does not originate in the previous, albeit limited, case-
law or the wording of the Article. In declaring its intention to no longer toler-
ate violations of EU law based on an expansive interpretation of Article 346
TFEU, the Commission seeks to strike a balance between the leeway with
which national authorities are endowed when dealing with matters close to the
core of national sovereignty, and the requirements set out by EU law in order
to ensure that no abuse of this leeway occurs. In this context, it is interesting
that the Commission should also engage in adjusting the list mentioned in
Article 346(2) TFEU in a rather creative manner.56 More importantly, one of
the main tenets of the Communication is the acknowledgement by the
Commission of the prerogative of the Member States to define their essential
security interests. It is interesting, however, that it should shy away from
developing this point further and elaborating on its implications for judicial
review. Is the control which the Court may exercise on the substance of the
national policy choices not inherently limited (provided, that is, that such
choices do not constitute an abuse of the rights which are acknowledged in
Article 346 TFEU)?57 This is what Advocate General Jacobs had suggested in
another related context, that is the adoption of national measures deviating
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from EU law when purporting to protect the essential interests of a Member
State under Article 347 TFEU.58
Both the tenor and the substance of the Commission’s document suggest
the proceduralisation of the ways in which Member States may exercise the
leeway granted under primary law in the area of defence industries. In terms
of the interpretation it sets out, it rather states what had clearly been the case
since the entry into force of the original Treaty. Therefore, the significance of
the document is that it reads like a declaration of intent, a statement of the
Commission’s willingness to step into areas of high political sensitivity.59
The willingness of the Commission to enforce the proper interpretation of
Article 346 TFEU, thus bringing the defence industries closer to the scope of
the application of EU law, should be assessed in the light of the considerable
policy activity which the EU institutions have shown in the area. The
European Commission had advocated the use of EU law, along with other
instruments, for the regulation of the defence industries since the mid-1990s.
After a series of initiatives assessing the serious economic problems facing
such industries,60 and advocating the adoption of a wide range of measures,61
the Commission put forward its so-called ‘defence package’ in December
2007,62 following which two specific measures have been adopted by the
Council, namely Directive 2009/43 on intra-EU transfers of defence prod-
ucts63 and Directive 2009/81 on public procurement in the fields of defence
and security.64 The main rationale of these measures is twofold: on the one
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hand, it is economic, that is to bring the benefits of the internal market to this
area which has been untouched by EU law; on the other hand, it is pragmatic,
in so far as it recognises the special features of the defence industries. The
latter are not only political, as they relate to the duty and the ability of a State
to protect its realm, but also economic, in so far as they relate to the special
conditions which prevail in the manufacture of and trade in defence-related
products. This is what Directive 2009/81 refers to as ‘the specificity of the
defence and security sector’.65
CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on the multifarious functions of legal rules in the area
of the Union’s security and defence policy. They may set out a political aspi-
ration, as the mutual assistance clause does; they may set out a broad frame-
work within which the Member States may decide how to act, as the
provisions on the permanent structured cooperation do; and even in cases
where they are clear as to their application, they may be ignored for a long
time until a combination of political, economic and legal developments
accepts their proper interpretation, as is the case with Article 346 TFEU.
For all their differing implications, these functions have something in
common: they illustrate the limits of legal rules in this area.66 In a Report by
the International Institute for Strategic Studies drawn up in 2008, it is pointed
out that ‘almost everything about defence in Europe remains resolutely
national’.67 This conclusion suggests not only the link between this area and
the core of national sovereignty, but also the practical and economic realities
of defence. For instance, as the United Kingdom is one of the few major EU
military powers, if the current Coalition Government followed up on the
Conservative Pary’s earlier pledge and withdrew the UK from the EDA,68 the
significance of the work of that organisation would inevitably be reduced.
Similar considerations apply to the usefulness of the provisions on the perma-
nent structured cooperation.
The inherently limited function of legal rules in the area of security and
defence policy is illustrated not only in the context of specific institutional
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innovations and mechanisms. Take, for instance, the general duty imposed on
Member States under Article 24(3) TEU. This reads as follows: ‘The Member
States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unre-
servedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the
Union’s action in this area.’ This provision suggests a twofold obligation: a
positive duty to take action which would be in accordance with the Union’s
policy, and a negative duty not to engage in a behaviour which would run
counter to the Union’s action. In its second subparagraph, Article 24(3) TEU
deals not with the definition of the term ‘solidarity’, but rather its develop-
ment: ‘The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their
mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is
contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a
cohesive force in international relations.’
The reference to ‘political solidarity’ is noteworthy, for it raises the ques-
tion whether its definition is as inherently indeterminate as it may appear at
first sight. Compliance with the above principles is to be ensured by the
High Representative and the Council. It is difficult to envisage how politi-
cal solidarity may be developed pursuant to a legally binding obligation
imposed by primary law. Involving a community of states each of which
may have differing foreign policy interests but all of which are committed
to respecting these interests and finding common ground, political solidar-
ity may not emerge from the application of legal obligations. Instead, it is
the outcome of a constantly evolving process of understanding and osmosis
which is brought about gradually, incrementally and often subconsciously.
What legal rules and procedures, such as those set out in Title V TEU, may
do is to contribute to a culture of cooperation amongst Member States
which is central to the development of political solidarity. However, they
may not give rise to it on the basis of legal duties imposed on Member
States.
The above is by no means to suggest the irrelevance of legal rules in this
area. Instead, it is to acknowledge that they constitute a living phenomenon
which should be understood as part of a gradually shifting, constantly evolv-
ing, multi-faceted legal and political space. This understanding of their func-
tion is particularly relevant in the light of the current existential crisis which
the Union faces. In the wake of the international financial crisis, the Union has
been going through its very own economic crisis in which it grapples with the
distinct possibility of sovereign default, and the threat this poses for the euro.
Having been forced to take extraordinary measures aiming to sustain its
economic position and to rethink the model of its economic governance, the
Union’s leaders focus on what they consider the very identity and future of
Europe. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, for instance, convinced the
Bundestag to approve German financial aid to Greece arguing that that was
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necessary for the future of Europe,69 the same argument used by the
Portuguese Prime Minister, José Sócrates, to justify the introduction of auster-
ity measures by his government;70 and the Commission President, José
Barroso made the same point when he implored Chancellor Merkel to agree to
the extraordinary process of setting up a permanent protective financial mech-
anism.
In this vein, it is noteworthy that the economic might of the Union was the
starting point for the development of its international ambitions.71 Therefore,
not only is it not surprising that the financial crisis has taken existential dimen-
sions, but it is also bound to have serious repercussions for the Union’s posture
in the world. As the Union’s success depends on various diverse factors –
political will and ingenuity, economic developments and the markets’
response, to name but a few – its management is bound to test the limits and
effectiveness of legal rules and procedures. The area of security and defence
would not be immune from these developments, as its effectiveness presup-
poses political will, economic investment, and outward-looking ambition
stemming from internal stability – and no legal rules may substitute for these.
